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On Leaving Room for Doubt
Using Frege–Geach to Illuminate Expressivism’s
Problem with Objectivity
David Faraci
[The Frege–Geach] problem itself, while possibly a devastating objec-
tion to expressivism, is in a certain way a ﬂuke—it does not, I think,
answer to the deeper worries some of us have about expressivism. If
God whispers in the ears of all the cognitivists that the Frege–Geach
problem can be very neatly solved, I do not foresee a trend of conver-
sion to expressivism.
(David Enoch, Taking Morality Seriously)
Expressivism holds that normative thought and language express non-
cognitive attitudes. In the literature, the central objection to the view has
been the Frege–Geach problem: roughly, the charge that expressivist seman-
tics cannot accommodate the fact that normative claims match ordinary
descriptive claims in their logical behavior. Yet, as David Enoch suggests
above, it seems few cognitivists are cognitivists because of this problem.
Why, then, have they spent so much time on it, and comparatively little
time laying out their “deeper worries?”
I suspect part of the explanation is that cognitivists understand these
deeper worries to be primarily metaphysical. For instance, many cognitivists
doubt that expressivism can accommodate their sense that normative truth
must be objective. It seems to them that expressivists have “to believe that
morality somehow depends on us, that the ultimate explanation of why it is
that certain moral claims are true has something to do with us and our
feelings and attitudes” (Enoch 2011, 36).
Yet no matter how obvious this might seem, expressivism is not a metaphys-
ical view, at least not straightforwardly, but rather a view about normative
thought and language. And many expressivists—in particular, quasi-realists1—
1 Most notably, Simon Blackburn (e.g. 1998) and Alan Gibbard (e.g. 2003).
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claim they can ultimately accommodate all of cognitivists’ (or at least the folk’s)
metaphysical talk. Not only is there normative truth, they maintain, but it is
objective, it reﬂects normative facts, and it concerns normative properties.2
Cognitivists might still worry that expressivists are failing to capture the spirit
of such talk. But these are difﬁcult charges to make stick.
In hopes of making these charges stick, I propose a shift in strategy.
Rather than trying to directly draw out the metaphysical commitments of
expressivist views, cognitivists should draw out the semantic commitments
of their own. They can then ask whether expressivist semantics are compat-
ible with those commitments.
This chapter showcases the proposed strategy with respect to intuitions
concerning objectivity. In what follows, I introduce two claims about
thought and language that, I suggest, represent these intuitions. I then
argue that popular expressivist views cannot accommodate the claims in
question if they are to solve “the negation problem”—part of Frege–Geach.
If successful, this shows that many prominent versions of expressivism really
do have a problem with objectivity. But, signiﬁcantly, it does so without
requiring any assumptions about what expressivist metaphysics looks like (if
there even is such a thing). As an added bonus, Frege–Geach turns out to be
relevant to some of cognitivists’ “deeper worries” after all.
The bulk of the chapter is a defense of the thesis that popular expressivist
solutions to the negation problem require rejection of a particular claim about
normative predicates (introduced in §10.2). First, however, I explain why
I take this claim to represent “deeper worries” about objectivity. I also consider
the extent to which expressivists themselves should ﬁnd my arguments
troubling.
10.1 LEAVING ROOM FOR DOUBT
Room for Doubt It is conceptually possible that there are no true
substantive normative claims.
Room for Doubt (from here, simply Doubt) tells us that it is coherent to
wonder whether anything is good or bad, right or wrong, virtuous or
vicious, what we ought (not) do, what we have normative reason to (not)
do, etc.3 Somewhat more simply, Doubt tells us that it is coherent to doubt
2 This has not come without its own costs, as some worry that this “creeping
minimalism” does too good a job of breaking down the barriers between expressivists
and cognitivists, failing to distinguish the views. See especially Dreier (2004).
3 On some views, I could simply say that substantive normative claims are those
that entail the existence of normative reasons. I don’t frame things this way in part
because I don’t wish to give the false impression that my arguments depend on any
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whether there is any truth about what to do, any answer to our deliberative
questions—for substantive normative claims provide answers (or at least
entail that there are answers4) to such questions.5 Standard examples of
substantive normative claims are “lying is wrong,” “pleasure is good,” and
“courage is virtuous.” Normative claims that are not substantive are claims
that employ normative terms but do not entail that there is an answer to
the question of what to do (let alone what that answer might be).
Uncontroversial examples of non-substantive normative claims are more
difﬁcult to ﬁnd, but possibilities include “nothing is wrong,” “desires are
non-normative,” and “one ought to promote the good.”6 (Given its
relationship with nihilistic doubt, a useful test for the substantiveness of
a normative claim is whether it is a claim that a normative nihilist—here,
someone who believes that all substantive normative claims are necessarily
false—could coherently accept. Arguably, each of the examples just mentioned
passes this test.)
Some expressivists seem perfectly happy to deny Doubt. Perhaps most
famously, R.M. Hare (1972) argues against the coherence of worrying that
“nothing matters.”7 Simplifying a bit, for Hare there is no sense in which
things might matter other than one grounded in their mattering to someone.
And things clearly matter to people.8
sort of reasons primacy. Nevertheless, since such views are fairly popular at the
moment, mentioning this may help some gain a clearer picture of what I’m talking
about.
4 When combined with non-normative facts about the actual world. This is why
“lying is wrong” is a substantive normative claim even though there are possible worlds
where it is impossible to lie, and thus where the claim provides no guidance.
5 My project relies heavily on the intuitive idea that some normative standards, such as
(most think) moral ones, answer the question of what to do in a way that others, such as
the rules of games, do not. There are some, even among cognitivists, who deny the
coherence of this distinction. See, e.g., Baker (m.s.), Copp (1997), and Tiffany (2007).
Unfortunately, I cannot address their arguments here, though for a sophisticated (and
frankly just cool) attempt to meet the challenge head on, deﬁning substantive normativity
in contrast to its non-authoritative cousins, see McPherson (m.s.).
6 This last supposing (controversially!) there is some relevant analytic connection
between the evaluative and the normative.
7 Hare was arguably not an expressivist per se. Regardless, expressivism is a sufﬁciently
close intellectual descendent of Hare’s prescriptivism to make his views relevant here.
8 An anonymous reviewer points out that this is actually consistent with Doubt,
since it is conceptually possible that no one cares about anything. That’s true, but if
we take it as given that people care about things, Hare’s view is inconsistent with the
epistemic possibility of nihilism, which is related to Doubt (but which I don’t include
in the ofﬁcial statement of Doubt since my focus here is thought and language,
not knowledge).
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Cognitivists are typically unimpressed by Hare’s remarks.9 As Derek
Parﬁt (2006) tells us, there seems to be a sense of “matters” that Hare is
failing to acknowledge. This is the sense in which something’s mattering is
an objective fact about value or normative reasons—one that is not ultim-
ately grounded in our attitudes towards it (or at least may not be, so far as
our concepts are concerned).
What matters here is that if Parﬁt and others are right that our concepts
make room for objective normative truth, surely it is coherent to wonder
whether such truth really is “out there” after all. We should be able to
entertain doubt about normative truth just as we can about other (poten-
tially) objective domains, such as when we ask our undergraduates to
consider Cartesian doubt about the external world. We do not ask them
to accept skepticism or nihilism about the external world, only to recognize
that such views are coherent, given that there is a potential gap between
what seems to be the case and what is. This is the sense in which Doubt
represents intuitions about normative objectivity.
Doubt strikes me as clearly and obviously true. I suspect many will share
this view. And I think those with relevant intuitions about objectivity should
share this view. Of course, intuitions about what is conceptually possible
are fallible. Some people believe that there can be true contradictions;
others think this conceptually impossible. Someone’s views here are failing
to line up with the truth.10 So while I think that it should at least count as a
signiﬁcant theoretical burden to rule out as conceptually incoherent some-
thing as apparently common as nihilistic doubt about normativity, Hare’s
view might still carry the day.
But I also suspect that not all expressivists will be so quick to reject
Doubt. As already mentioned, contemporary expressivists seem generally
less willing than their mid-century counterparts to explain away or dismiss
as confused apparent features of normative discourse. I submit that Doubt
represents such a feature. If any expressivists agree—or ﬁnd Doubt inde-
pendently plausible—then my arguments here should worry, or at least
interest, them. I will say no more, though, about who should or will wish to
embrace Doubt. My thesis is not that expressivism must accommodate it,
only that common forms of expressivism cannot do so. This is because
Doubt supports a further claim about normative semantics which they
also cannot accommodate.
9 Though even a few cognitivists have tried (wildly unsuccessfully, in my view) to
argue for nihilism’s incoherence (though not in those terms). For presentation and
criticism of such arguments, see, e.g., Dworkin (1996), Olson (2010), Pigden (2007),
Sinnott-Armstrong (2006), and Tännsjö (2009).
10 Well, assuming this isn’t a true contradiction . . .
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10.2 THE NO NORMATIVE EXHAUSTION THESIS
Again, substantive normative claims answer (or at least entail that there is an
answer to) the question of what to do. Such claims typically employ norma-
tive predicates (or concepts) like “is good,”11 “is bad,” “is a normative
reason,” etc. One way to think about what makes a normative claim
substantive is that it does not merely use or mention one of these predicates,
but entails that something is so predicated. Following this thought, I will
characterize substantive normative predicates as follows:
Substantive Normative Predicate P is a substantive normative predi-
cate iff any claim that entails ∃x(Px) (where x is non-normative12) is a
substantive normative claim.13
Now, take a set of predicates, S: {P1, P2, . . . Pn}. Suppose S exhausts
conceptual space such that, as a matter of conceptual necessity, for every
subject X, X is predicated by some member of set S (X is P1 or X is P2 or . . .
or X is Pn). Call sets of predicates that meet these conditions exhaustive
predicate sets.
I want to suggest that if Doubt is true, we should further accept:
The No Normative Exhaustion Thesis No exhaustive predicate set is
composed entirely of substantively normative predicates.
To see the basic idea, suppose that two predicates, “matters positively” and
“matters negatively,” constitute an exhaustive predicate set. As a matter of
conceptual necessity, everything matters either positively or negatively. If
that were the case, then of course it would be incoherent to wonder whether
anything matters, for all things would matter either positively or negatively.
For The No Normative Exhaustion Thesis (from here, simply Not
Exhaustive) to follow from Doubt, we need two assumptions. First, Not
Exhaustive must be a claim about “conceptual predicates,” not just linguis-
tic ones. Otherwise, Doubt fails to support Not Exhaustive insofar as it is
11 Again, I’m assuming here a tight connection between the evaluative and the
normative. Perhaps this is a mistake. For instance, it might be conceptually possible
that while certain things are good, there’s nothing I ought to do about it. (Indeed, this
might be true even if it is conceptually necessary that one ought to promote the good.
Suppose, for instance, that ought implies can and that we are simply incapable of
promoting any of the things that are good.) Nevertheless, this possibility seems precious
enough not to interfere with our discussion here.
12 This is to accommodate the fact that, e.g., “one ought promote the good” is
arguably non-substantive.
13 Note that this accords well with the fact that “pleasure is good; pain is bad” is a
substantive normative claim, while “nothing is good; nothing is bad” is not.
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possible that there are coherent nihilistic doubts (a fact about normative
thought), but the right semantic theory entails that the terms necessary to
express it don’t exist in any language (a fact about normative language). This
narrows the target of my arguments to forms of expressivism that are about
normative thought, as well as language. My impression is that most actual
expressivists have such ambitions.14
To see the second assumption required to get from Doubt to Not
Exhaustive, consider the predicate set {“is wrong,” “is not wrong”}. I take
this to be an exhaustive predicate set. But suppose one takes the view that,
conceptually, wrongness can only apply to actions, and thus that if X is not
an action—say, if it’s the number 2—the question of wrongness simply
doesn’t apply. Thus, it is neither the case that 2 is wrong, nor that 2 is not
wrong. Or suppose that X is “what the present King of France just did.”
Again, perhaps it is neither the case that X is wrong nor that X is not wrong.
Thus, while intuitively {“is wrong,” “is not wrong”} seems like an exhaustive
predicate set, the existence of phenomena like category error and presup-
position failure may suggest that there are no true exhaustive predicate sets.
Given this, the deﬁnition of “exhaustive predicate set” will need to be
amended to make room for things like category error and presupposition
failure—presumably, limiting the scope of possible values for x in certain
relevant ways. This should not be difﬁcult (though I won’t make good on
that claim here). But once accomplished, a problem remains. If nihilistic
doubt itself involves such phenomena, Doubt would fail to support Not
Exhaustive. Suppose, for instance, that nihilism is best understood as the
view that all substantive normative claims involve presupposition failure.
In that case, “is wrong” and “is not wrong” could both be substantive
normative predicates, and this would pose no threat to the possibility of
nihilistic doubt.
Earlier, I deﬁned nihilism as the view that all substantive normative
claims are necessarily false, which rules out the suggestion that nihilism
involves presupposition failure.15 But this is not a problem that can be
solved by deﬁnitional ﬁat. To meet the challenge, I would need to show that
14 Perhaps some will ﬁnd “merely semantic” expressivism promising (some have
implied that they would, in discussion). For my own part, I fail to see the appeal. If
normative thought encourages us to take seriously something our semantics obfuscates,
that just looks to me like an excellent reason to change our language. If merely semantic
expressivism is true, let us be revolutionary cognitivists! In any case, I continue to speak
primarily in linguistic terms, rather than conceptual ones, because I am engaging with the
Frege–Geach literature, which is typically framed in linguistic terms. My thanks to Walter
Sinnott-Armstrong and two anonymous reviewers for pointing out the value in addressing
these issues.
15 Assuming presupposition failure renders claims neither true nor false.
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the sort of commonplace nihilistic doubt supported by intuitions about
normative objectivity involves ﬁrst-order denial of substantive normative
claims, rather than something like presupposition failure. This is too large a
task to be completed here. However, two things should be noted. First, in
order for my argument to go through, it does not have to be the case that all
nihilistic doubt is as I’ve described, only that some is. And it is quite plausible
that the sort of doubt experienced by, say, angsty teenagers accords with my
deﬁnition. Second, even if I am wrong, this would complicate matters, but
not necessarily eliminate the relevant challenge to expressivism.
In any case, I continue on the presumption that Doubt supports Not
Exhaustive. In what remains, I argue that popular forms of expressivism
cannot accommodate Not Exhaustive if they are to solve the negation
problem. If I’m right that intuitions about normative objectivity support
Doubt, and that Doubt supports Not Exhaustive, this illuminates a
tension between those intuitions and expressivism. I will not prove that
no forms of expressivism can accommodate Not Exhaustive.16 Neverthe-
less, I believe my arguments clarify some of cognitivists’ deeper worries
about the view. Any expressivists who share or wish to address such
worries, or who agree that Doubt and Not Exhaustive are independently
plausible, should be motivated to search for forms of expressivism that
fare better.
10.3 THE NEGATION PROBLEM
Consider the claims:
S1. Murdering is wrong.
S2. Murdering is not wrong.
I contend that prominent forms of expressivism cannot both (a) explain why
S1 and S2 are inconsistent and (b) maintain that exactly one of “is wrong”
and “is not wrong” is a substantive normative predicate.17 Accomplishing
(a) is necessary for solving the Frege–Geach problem. Accomplishing (b) is
16 For one thing, my arguments depend on the claim that expressivists need a special
semantics. Some hold, by contrast, that expressivism can be a purely metasemantic theory.
See, e.g., Silk (2014) and Sinclair (2011). Whether “metasemantic expressivism” runs
afoul of intuitions about objectivity must be left for consideration elsewhere.
17 This particular example is somewhat problematic, given that some take murdering
to be wrong by deﬁnition. I use this example because it is the one employed by Mark
Schroeder (2008). Since I rely on Schroeder’s discussion of relevant issues further on in
the chapter, I use his example for consistency. It should be obvious that nothing
signiﬁcant turns on this choice.
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necessary for accommodating Not Exhaustive, since “is wrong” and “is not
wrong” form an exhaustive predicate set.18
I proceed as follows. First, drawing on Mark Schroeder’s (2008) discus-
sion, I consider two generalized expressivist strategies for explaining the
inconsistency of S1 and S2.19 Schroeder pursues one of these, rejecting the
other for reasons I recount below. In §10.4.1 and §10.5.1, I consider what
I take to be the only plausible strategies available to the Schroeder-style
expressivist for accommodatingNot Exhaustive. I argue that these strategies
are overwhelmingly likely to fail. In §10.4.2 and §10.5.2, I consider
whether expressivists taking the line Schroeder rejects fare any better with
respect to accommodating Not Exhaustive. I conclude that they do not.
10.3.1 Inconsistency for Expressivists
S1 and S2 are inconsistent. It is natural to think that this is because their
contents are inconsistent. It is also natural to think that if I were to assert
both S1 and S2, I would be inconsistent (in the sense that I would be
rationally criticizable in a certain way). Finally, it seems clear that if I assert
S1 and you assert S2, we thereby disagree.20
Unlike the cognitivist, the expressivist cannot accept that S1 and S2 are
inconsistent because they have inconsistent propositional contents (“mur-
dering is wrong” and “murdering is not wrong,” respectively). This is
because, for the expressivist, S1 doesn’t have propositional content in the
way it does for the cognitivist.21 Rather, for the expressivist, S1 and S2 must
be inconsistent because the attitudes they express are inconsistent (Schroeder
2008, 39–41).22
Return now to the wrongness of murdering. As Schroeder (2008, 44–5)
points out, there are a number of relevant conditions you might be in with
18 Denying this won’t avoid the problem, just force a move to whatever predicates are
such that nihilists can coherently assert “X is P1” and thereby contradict some substantive
normative claim “X is P2.”
19 Schroeder draws on Unwin (1999) and (2001) in his presentation of the problem.
Schroeder discusses alternative proposed solutions from Blackburn (1988), Dreier
(2006), Gibbard (2003), and Horgan and Timmons (2006). According to Schroeder,
most of these proposals fail for the same reason, to be discussed shortly. Though I will
not discuss any speciﬁc proposals, the relevant discussion below applies indirectly to
those mentioned here.
20 All assertions presumed sincere and non-equivocating.
21 Many expressivists will accept that S1 and S2 express propositions understood in a
minimalist sense, but it is widely agreed that this cannot do the relevant explanatory work
it does for the cognitivist.
22 At least for “semantic expressivists.” See note 16.
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respect to the proposition that murdering is wrong, differing only23 in
where, if anywhere, we place a “not.” It might be that:
S3. You judge that murdering is wrong.
S4. You do not judge that murdering is wrong.
S5. You judge that murdering is not wrong.
S6. You judge that not murdering is wrong.
Cognitivists have no trouble making sense of these different conditions; they
just take “judge” to mean “believe.” What of the expressivist? Following
Schroeder, consider an expressivist who holds that to judge something
wrong is to DISAPPROVE of it, where DISAPPROVAL is a particular non-cognitive
attitude.24 Now the expressivist tries to translate each of the states you might
be in:
3E. You DISAPPROVE of murdering.
4E. You do not DISAPPROVE of murdering.
5E. You . . . ???
6E. You DISAPPROVE of not murdering.
Apparently, the expressivist has no way of differentiating between merely
not thinking that murdering is wrong (S4) and thinking that murdering is
not wrong (S5). The reason is simple. For the cognitivist, in each case one
bears or does not bear a particular cognitive attitude (belief) towards a
predicative proposition, which has both a subject (murdering) and a predi-
cate (“is wrong”). But for the expressivist, the non-cognitive attitude (DISAP-
PROVAL) is borne simply towards an action—murdering. And so the
expressivist has one less “slot for the not.”
At this point, Schroeder (2008, 45–8) argues, the expressivist has two
options. First, she can introduce a new attitude. She can say that the transla-
tion includes:
5E. You TOLERATE murdering.
But in order to go this route, Schroeder argues, the DA-expressivist (for
“distinct attitudes”) must maintain that DISAPPROVAL and TOLERANCE are
distinct, primitive, non-cognitive attitudes that are nevertheless (and it
might seem, inexplicably) inconsistent. For Schroeder, this is a deal-breaker.
(More on this in §10.4.2.)
23 Modulo the grammatically necessary “do” in S4.
24 Throughout, I use small capital letters to denote “special” non-cognitive attitudes.
These attitudes are not necessarily those that we associate with the names given them.
Thus, DISAPPROVAL may not be the attitude commonly referred to as “disapproval.”
Rather, it is a stand-in for some expressivist-friendly wrongness-connoting non-cognitive
attitude.
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The other option for the expressivist is Schroeder’s (2008, 58–61) route,
which involves making another slot for the not. The way to do this is to
follow the cognitivist’s example by introducing a general non-cognitive
attitude that can be borne towards something with two “slots,” rather
than simply towards an action. Schroeder calls this umbrella attitude
BEING FOR, and it allows the expressivist to understand S3–S6 as follows:
3F. You are FOR blaming for murdering.
4F. You are not FOR blaming for murdering.
5F. You are FOR not blaming for murdering.
6F. You are FOR blaming for not murdering.
If Schroeder is right, expressivists will need to extend this BEING FOR solution
as a view about the semantics of all declarative sentences. After all, it is
perfectly acceptable to make claims that involve both normative and non-
normative predicates, such as “The sky is blue and murdering is wrong.”
And, as Schroeder (2008, ch. 7) argues, the only way to understand such
sentences in a way that will maintain their logical form is to understand
belief in terms of BEING FOR.25 (The importance of this point will become
clear shortly.)
So, according to what Schroeder calls “biforcated [sic; it’s a pun] attitude
semantics” (BAS), the semantic value of any predicate is a relation26 (e.g. “is
wrong” means “blaming for”), and judging that something is so predicated
means committing oneself to bearing the relevant relation towards it (e.g.
judging something wrong means committing oneself to blaming for it).
Thus, in brief, “we interpret the property associated with each [declarative]
sentence, ‘P’, as telling us what someone who [judges] that P is thereby
committed to doing” (Schroeder 2012, 736, emphasis added).
10.4 ACCOMMODATING NOT EXHAUSTIVE :
STRATEGY ONE
10.4.1 BAS-Expressivism
According to BAS-expressivism (as presented by Schroeder), when one
claims that murdering is wrong, one expresses BEING FOR blaming for
25 Or the other way around, but of course that’s not an option for expressivists.
Presumably, expressivists who take the TOLERANCE route won’t have to extend their
view in this way. Rather, they will have the more familiar problem of having to ﬁgure
out what attitude is expressed by such “hybrid” claims.
26 Actually, it’s a pair of relations (hence the bi-). But this is irrelevant for our
purposes.
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murdering. When one claims that murdering is not wrong, one expresses
BEING FOR not blaming for murdering. The former is a substantive normative
judgment (SNJ)—i.e. a judgment that something non-normative is sub-
stantively normatively predicated. According to Not Exhaustive, since S1 is
an SNJ, S2 cannot be (again, because “is wrong” and “is not wrong”
constitute an exhaustive predicate set). Obviously, for this to be the case,
BEING FOR something cannot always be an SNJ.
The BAS-expressivist seems to have no problem here. After all, she holds
that all judgments involve BEING FOR. Since presumably not all judgments
are SNJs, BEING FOR something is not always an SNJ. But this does raise an
important question: If normative and non-normative judgments aren’t
distinguished by the attitudes they express, what does distinguish them?
This question illuminates a potential problem for BAS-expressivism. Part
of what’s supposed to be appealing about expressivism is its ability to
vindicate our sense that SNJ has a special connection with action. When
I judge that something is right, wrong, good, bad, etc., it seems that
I thereby commit (and perhaps am even motivated) to (not) doing some-
thing. On a cognitivist view, this is surprising given wide acceptance of the
idea that beliefs alone can’t lead us to act; we need a desire, or something like
it, for that.27 If SNJs are more like desires anyway, the puzzle evaporates.
But according to BAS, all judgments express BEING FOR, and what someone
is FOR tells us what he is “committed to doing.” One might thus worry that
BAS-expressivists can’t account for SNJ’s distinctive connection with action
not because they treat SNJs as too belief-like—the worry for cognitivists—
but because they treat non-normative judgments as too desire-like!
I think BAS-expressivists have a plausible response here. On Schroeder’s
model, ordinary descriptive beliefs involve (roughly) BEING FOR proceeding as
if what one believed were the case. For instance, believing that grass is green
is (roughly) BEING FOR proceeding as if grass is green. Arguably, there is
nothing that, alone, counts as proceeding as if grass is green. Believing that
grass is green doesn’t commit one to doing anything particular until one’s
other attitudes come into play (e.g. one has a desire to have a green area in
front of one’s home).
Call a relation discriminating if merely bearing that relation to some object
commits one to doing something particular (which may be disjunctive, but
rules out some options). “Proceeding as if” seems to be a non-discriminating
relation. This motivates a plausible way of drawing the distinction between
normative and non-normative judgments that captures the former’s distinctive
27 Of course, not everyone accepts this, but among those who do, it is often taken to
speak in favor of expressivism.
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connection with action: the former are instances of BEING FOR discriminating
relations; the latter are instances of BEING FOR non-discriminating ones.
Unfortunately, this solution exacerbates worries about BAS-expressivist
accommodation ofNot Exhaustive, since BEING FOR not blaming clearly does
commit one in a particular way (i.e. to not blaming), and thus would fall on
the discriminating, and therefore normative, side of this divide.
Of course, our discussion isn’t really about blame (or murder, for that
matter). “Blame” is just a stand-in for whatever relation one commits to
bearing towards something one judges to be wrong. So let us abstract
away and say that judging that X is wrong is BEING FOR Φ-ing X and
judging that X is not wrong is BEING FOR not Φ-ing X.28 The question,
then, is whether there are any suitable candidates for Φ such that BEING
FOR Φ-ing X entails making an SNJ while BEING FOR not Φ-ing X does not.
This seems unlikely, if not impossible. The trouble is that if Φ discrim-
inates, not Φ does too. If committing to Φ-ing commits one to doing
something or other, committing to not Φ-ing commits one to doing no
such thing.
Of course, BAS-expressivists might propose some other way of accom-
modating SNJ’s distinctive connection with action that also accommo-
dates Not Exhaustive, though I cannot think of one. And there still
remains the possibility that it is not the nature of Φ itself, but rather
the combination of BEING FOR and Φ that distinguishes SNJ (in a way that
the combination of BEING FOR and not Φ does not). And, to be fair, very
little has been said about what BEING FOR is like, so perhaps once we
understand what kind of commitment the expressivist is talking about, it
will turn out that being committed in this way to Φ-ing X (for some Φ)
entails judging that X is wrong. But it is at least as hard to see what kind
of commitment that could be as it is to imagine what Φ could be in the
ﬁrst place.29
The only other out here, so far as I can see, would be to claim that Φ is an
“inherently normative relation.” Return brieﬂy to blame. Roughly, the idea
would be that blaming for non-wrong things is a category error. One
commits to not blaming for things that aren’t wrong not in the same
“moralized” sense that one commits to blaming for things that are wrong,
but just in the sense that blaming for non-wrong things is incoherent.
Perhaps even nihilists are rationally committed to not blaming for anything,
28 Of course, BEING FOR is just a placeholder too.
29 And, remember, the nature of Φ itself must play a signiﬁcant enough role in making
BEING FOR Φ-ing X an SNJ such that BEING FOR Φ-ing X is in some relevant way different
from, say, BEING FOR proceeding as if P, which is apparently not an SNJ.
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if blame is only appropriate where there is (apparent) wrongness, just in
virtue of the kind of relation it is.30
I am resistant to this kind of line in general. But what matters here is not
whether it is independently plausible, but only that it is very hard to see how
BAS-expressivists could make use of it. The natural way to cash all this out,
after all, is to suggest that “blaming for” entails “judging wrong.” Where else
would one locate a rational error in blaming for non-wrong things? But the
BAS-expressivist cannot say this, on pain of circularity. Having just deﬁned
“judging wrong” partly in terms of blame, surely she cannot also understand
blame itself in terms of judging wrong. Yet without this, it is hard to see how
she could maintain that blame (indeed, that almost any relation) is such that
committing to bearing that relation towards something entails making an SNJ.
Let’s recap: Schroeder has offered the expressivist a recipe for developing a
semantic theory that can explain the inconsistency of S1 and S2. According
to that recipe, SNJ involves BEING FOR—being, in some sense, committed
to—bearing certain relations (the ones that constitute the semantic values of
normative predicates) to objects of judgment. Thus, judging that murdering
is wrong is “BEING FOR Φ-ing murdering.” And judging that murdering is
not wrong is “BEING FOR not Φ-ing murdering.” If Not Exhaustive is true,
then BAS-expressivists need to be able to explain how it can be that “BEING
FOR Φ-ing” is an SNJ while “BEING FOR not Φ-ing” is not. This raises two
problems. First, given that all judgments involve BEING FOR, the BAS-
expressivist needs to explain what distinguishes normative judgments from
non-normative ones. I offered a plausible answer in terms of the distinction
between discriminating and non-discriminating relations. However, I further
argued that there are unlikely to be—indeed, that it may be impossible for
there to be—candidates forΦ such that committing toΦ-ing is discriminating
while committing to not Φ-ing is not. I therefore submit that the BAS-
expressivist who solves the negation problem in this way will be unable to
accommodateNot Exhaustive. At the very least, this means the onus is on the
BAS-expressivist to give us some reason to think that she can construct a
plausible normative psychology to ﬁll out this BAS schema in a way that’s
compatible with Not Exhaustive.
10.4.2 DA-Expressivism
Schroeder maintains that the move to BAS is necessary for the expressivist to
explain the inconsistency of S1 and S2. But, as already mentioned, not
30 Just to help frame the thought, this is a broadly “Strawsonian” point. Thanks to
David Shoemaker for helpful discussion on this point.
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everyone agrees with him on this point. It is thus worth considering whether
DA-expressivism (again, for “distinct attitudes”) fares any better with respect
to explaining the inconsistency of S1 and S2 without needing to reject Not
Exhaustive.
Our example DA-expressivist holds that “murdering is wrong” expresses
DISAPPROVAL while “murdering is not wrong” expresses TOLERANCE. Accord-
ing to Not Exhaustive, it follows that since DISAPPROVING of murdering is an
SNJ, TOLERATING murdering is not. This is, of course, precisely analogous
to Not Exhaustive’s entailing that, for the BAS-expressivist, since BEING FOR
Φ-ing murdering is an SNJ, BEING FOR not Φ-ing murdering is not. The
question is whether DA-expressivists can plausibly maintain this.
In his discussion, Schroeder distinguishes two ways in which attitudes can
be inconsistent. A-type inconsistency results from bearing tokens of the same
attitude towards inconsistent contents—e.g. believing P and believing
~P. B-type inconsistency results from bearing two distinct yet inconsistent
attitudes towards the same content—e.g. for the DA-expressivist, DISAPPROV-
ING of X and TOLERATING X. Schroeder writes:
A-type inconsistency is something that we should all recognize and be familiar with.
It happens with beliefs, for example. But B-type inconsistency is not something that
expressivists can take for granted, because there are no good examples of it. Assuming
that DISAPPROVAL and TOLERANCE are inconsistent is taking for granted everything that
expressivists need to explain. (Schroeder 2008, 49)
Given this, one option for the DA-expressivist is just to bite the bullet and
claim that, inexplicable as it may seem, certain pairs of attitudes are B-type
inconsistent, and that’s that. If the DA-expressivist takes this line, then
perhaps it is not much of a leap for her to further claim that in each case at
least one of the relevant attitudes doesn’t constitute an SNJ.
I suspect, however, that no actual expressivists would be comfortable with
such a blatantly ad hoc response. Rather, actual DA-expressivists typically
believe, contra Schroeder above, that there are perfectly good examples of
B-type inconsistency. If that’s the case, DA-expressivists are in no worse
shape than BAS-expressivists in appealing to an analogy to other cases of
disagreement in attitude.
Are there other cases of B-type inconsistency? Some think so. In their
defense of B-type inconsistency, for example, Baker and Woods (2015)
mention the attitude pair like/dislike (among others). Arguably, I am
irrational if I both like and dislike the same thing. Other possible example
pairs include approval and disapproval, love and hate, or respect and
disrespect. In each of these cases, the attitudes in question are distinct
attitudes—love is not merely the absence of hate, for instance—yet they
seem to be at odds, at least to some degree.
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I don’t think cases like this will get the DA-expressivist very far. I don’t
think, for one, that if I love chocolate ice cream and you hate it, we thereby
disagree. So the kind of inconsistency here is arguably not of the right kind
to help the DA-expressivist make sense of interpersonal disagreement about
the normative (which she needs to). But I do not need to settle this issue
here. The point here is only that DA-expressivists who deny that their view
is ad hoc are going to have to either offer a brand new explanation for B-type
inconsistency (something that has never been attempted, so far as I know)
or appeal to the precedent set by other examples of B-type inconsistency
(as Baker and Woods do). In taking this latter tack, something like the
relationship between liking and disliking is probably their best ally—the
question of whether it is good enough can be set aside.
Let us assume, then, that I am right about what the DA-expressivist
strategy is going to look like. The worry is this: suppose that the DA-
expressivist appeals to an analogy with a case of apparent inconsistency
between the members of distinct non-cognitive attitude pairs, examples of
which, again, might include like and dislike, approval and disapproval, love
and hate, or respect and disrespect. I submit that in each of these cases, the
idea that the relevant attitudes are inconsistent seems acceptable because
there is a sense in which the attitudes lead one in opposing directions. The
ways in which one typically responds to something one likes seem to conﬂict
with the ways one typically responds to something one dislikes. Something
similar can be said for each of the cases mentioned and, indeed, I think, for
all plausible cases of disagreement between distinct attitudes.31
The complaint here mirrors the complaint against the analogous BAS
move. In §10.4.1, I pointed out that if Φ is a discriminating relation, such
that BEING FORΦ-ing commits one to doing something particular, and it is this
that distinguishes it as an SNJ, surely BEING FOR not Φ-ing is likewise discrim-
inating. Similarly, here, when a DA-expressivist says that DISAPPROVAL (at least
of certain things, like murdering) constitutes an SNJ, this means that DISAP-
PROVAL commits one to responding to its object in certain ways. It is natural to
think, on analogy with the examples of disagreement in attitude just men-
tioned, that if TOLERANCE is inconsistent with DISAPPROVAL, this is because
31 An anonymous reviewer worries that this is not the case for disapproval vs. tolerance,
that while disapproval and approval lead one in opposing directions, disapproval and
tolerance do not, for the latter leads one in no direction. That sounds wrong to me; it
seems to me that to tolerate something requires one to do certain things, such as not
chastising those who engage in it. Perhaps some take a more permissive view of tolerance.
But notice that the more permissive one gets—e.g. if one automatically counts as tolerating
all the things whose existence one is unaware of—the less plausible it is that tolerance can do
the work the expressivist needs it to, that to judge it permissible to A could just be to tolerate
A-ing (or, in our terms, that to TOLERATE A-ing could be to tolerate A-ing).
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TOLERANCE commits one in ways that conﬂict with the ways DISAPPROVAL
commits one. If that’s right, it’s hard to see how DISAPPROVAL of something
could constitute an SNJ without TOLERANCE of its doing the same.
As in the BAS case, this is not a proof of the impossibility of a
DA-expressivist solution to this problem. Rather, it is a challenge to the
DA-expressivist to give us some reason to think she can develop a plausible
normative psychology. We should be suspicious of her ability to do so when
we recognize how unlikely it seems that though DISAPPROVAL and TOLERANCE
are similar enough to conﬂict—perhaps because they lead one in opposing
directions—only one of the two has those features that make it an SNJ.
10.5 ACCOMMODATING NOT EXHAUSTIVE :
STRATEGY TWO
10.5.1 BAS-Expressivism
In §10.4.1, I argued that BAS-expressivists cannot accommodate Not
Exhaustive by maintaining that BEING FOR bearing a particular relation
involves SNJ while BEING FOR not bearing that relation does not. Of course,
this is only a problem for the BAS-expressivist if judging that murdering is not
wrong involves BEING FOR something. Thus far, I assumed this was the case.
To see the second available strategy for attempting to accommodate Not
Exhaustive, recall the relevant BAS interpretations (continuing to generalize
from blaming to Φ-ing):
4F. You are not FOR Φ-ing murdering.
5F. You are FOR not Φ-ing murdering.
6F. You are FOR Φ-ing not murdering.
While (5F) and (6F) entail BEING FOR, (4F) does not. Thus, if the BAS-
expressivist were to reinterpret judging that murdering is not wrong in line
with (4F) (at least in certain cases, like when a nihilist is speaking), such that
it is merely not BEING FOR Φ-ing murdering, then our earlier worries would
dissipate. And, indeed, it seems quite plausible that if judging murdering
wrong is BEING FOR Φ-ing murdering, one who judges that murdering is not
wrong would not BE FOR Φ-ing murdering.
Unfortunately, the expressivist is not merely trying to say something
about what’s going on in the head of someone who judges that murdering
is not wrong; she is trying to offer an account of what such a person (let’s call
him John) expresses when he asserts that murdering is not wrong. What’s
more, John needs to express something that is inconsistent with whatever is
expressed by someone who asserts that murdering is wrong.
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There are potential problems along both lines. First, it may not be
possible to directly express the absence of an attitude.32 Arguably, when
we express something we indicate what mental state(s) we are in. But while
it is quite plausible that having an attitude is a particular mental state (or set
thereof), it is not at all clear that lacking an attitude is.
Second, even if it is possible to directly express the absence of an attitude,
the basic challenge to explain the inconsistency of S1 and S2 would still not
be met. The problem of disagreement remains. If I believe that grass is green
and you don’t (perhaps you’ve never seen grass), we do not thereby dis-
agree.33 In order to take this line, the expressivist would therefore need to
understand John’s utterance as expressing an absence of BEING FOR and show
that, in apparent contrast to all other attitudes, BEING FOR something is
sufﬁcient for disagreement with those who merely fail to BE FOR it.34
One possible out here would be to claim that John is expressing (4F)
indirectly, via expressing some further attitude—call it NIHILO. It should be
clear, though, that this will be of no help to the BAS-expressivist. The
relevant conﬂict would now be between BEING FOR and NIHILO, as opposed to
between BEING FOR and not BEING FOR. This would be an instance of B-type
32 As opposed to “indirectly” expressing it—reporting the absence or expressing other
attitudes that entail or imply it. I discuss the possibility of appealing to such indirect
expression shortly.
33 An anonymous reviewer suggests that this may not be the case for credences.
Suppose I, having no evidence regarding P, have credence 0.5 in P, while you, also
without evidence regarding P, have credence 0.9. It might seem we thereby disagree.
The reviewer anticipates my response, which is that the disagreement is located in our
higher-order attitudes regarding what credences our information supports. The reviewer
thinks it reasonable to resist this, to locate the disagreement in the credences themselves,
and that this might be a resource for the expressivist. I’ll offer two pieces of evidence for
my anticipated response. First, notice that we can elicit the same intuitions about belief/
lack of belief by stipulating shared evidence. If neither of us has any evidence about P,
yet you believe P and I fail to, arguably we disagree. Surely, this is essentially the same
disagreement as in the credences case: one about what attitudes our evidence supports.
Second, suppose we stipulate that you and I both take an epistemically permissive view
on which a range of credences (that includes both 0.5 and 0.9) is permissible. The
appearance of disagreement evaporates, suggesting it stemmed from implicit assump-
tions about our higher-order beliefs. (It is unclear whether we can do the same thing for
belief/disbelief. Do you and I disagree if you believe P, I disbelieve P, but we both think
it is epistemically permissible to both believe and disbelieve P, given our shared
evidence? I am genuinely uncertain what to say about this, though I suspect we still
count as disagreeing in at least some relevant sense that we need not in the belief/lack of
belief and 0.5/0.9 credence cases.)
34 This move is open to the BAS-expressivist on the assumption that belief and its
absence count as the same attitude-type, which they arguably do not. If they do not, then
this line falls afoul of Schroeder’s worries about B-type inconsistency which, again, was a
primary motivation for the move to BAS in the ﬁrst place.
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inconsistency, rejection of which is a large part of what motivated BAS in
the ﬁrst place.35
Summing up: a natural alternative to understanding John’s judgment that
murdering is not wrong as his BEING FOR not Φ-ing murdering is to
understand him simply as not BEING FOR Φ-ing murdering. Unfortunately,
this line faces a dilemma. Either John is merely expressing his lack of BEING
FOR or he is expressing some further attitude as well. If the former, it is not
clear why John disagrees with someone who is FOR the relevant thing (again,
just as you and I don’t disagree simply because you have a belief I lack). If
the latter, it seems the BAS-expressivist would have to appeal to B-type
inconsistency, rejection of which is what led her to BAS in the ﬁrst place.36
10.5.2 DA-Expressivism
As before, the DA-expressivist has a second strategy analogous to the BAS-
expressivist’s. Recall the DA-expressivist’s interpretations:
4E. You do not DISAPPROVE of murdering.
5E. You TOLERATE murdering.
6E. You DISAPPROVE of not murdering.
35 Gunnar Björnsson suggests a related alternative (in discussion, but see his 2001):
perhaps the correct expressivist semantics is even more complex than suggested by either
DA or BAS versions of the view, always including both ﬁrst-order attitudes (e.g. BEING FOR
blaming for) and second-order attitudes of ACCEPTANCE and REJECTION. On this view,
nihilists REJECT all ﬁrst-order normative attitudes. This is a rather different kind of
expressivist semantics from either BAS- or DA-expressivism. Perhaps it can deal with
the problem I’ve raised here. Speaking in favor of this is its place in the dialectic.
Schroeder motivates his solution to the negation problem by noting the need for added
structure, in order to distinguish “not judging” from “judging not.” One way to read my
challenge is as illuminating the need to distinguish “judging not [internal negation]” from
“judging not [external negation].” Perhaps this calls for further structure along the very
lines Björnsson proposes. Of course, we still need a full account of ACCEPTANCE and
REJECTION and of what makes them inconsistent (some of which Björnsson offers). But
most importantly in my mind, we need to consider whether REJECTION of the relevant
ﬁrst-order attitudes can fail to count as an SNJ—i.e. we need to make sure this view
doesn’t just move the bump in the rug. I have concerns along these lines, but discussion of
these will have to be left for another time.
36 There are, of course, other, more radical reinterpretations I haven’t discussed. For
example, the expressivist could hold that John (supposing he is a nihilist) is expressing his
BEING FOR not BEING FOR any discriminating relations. First, this has certain bizarre
implications. For instance, for this to be a general solution to the problem, it would
presumably have to turn out that all negated normative claims (“murdering is not wrong,”
“pain is not bad,” “lying is not vicious”) are semantically equivalent (at least for the
nihilist). I also suspect that such radical reinterpretations would run up against other
arguments made in this chapter, though I do not have the space to explore this issue
further here.
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Just like the BAS-expressivist, in order to avoid the challenge of explaining
why DISAPPROVAL involves SNJ while TOLERANCE does not, the DA-
expressivist might look to (4E) and suggest that judging that murdering is
not wrong is simply not DISAPPROVING of murdering.
First, we might again question whether it is possible to directly express the
absence of an attitude. Second, and again as in the BAS case, this view
requires the DA-expressivist to maintain that if I DISAPPROVE of murdering
and you do not, we thereby disagree. Of course, a DA-expressivist might be
able to maintain this (and, indeed, given her apparently permissive attitude
towards inconsistency, perhaps she is better situated to do so than the BAS-
expressivist), but this would surely be a rather large bullet to bite.
The ﬁnalmove here would be, once again as in the BAS case, to suggest that
there is some further attitude (NIHILO) the having of which implies or entails a
lack of DISAPPROVAL. Unlike the BAS-expressivist, the DA-expressivist may be
comfortable maintaining that NIHILO is inconsistent with DISAPPROVALwithout
explaining why (presumably to the same extent that she is comfortable doing
so in the case of DISAPPROVAL and TOLERANCE). Of course, there will be the
question of how to distinguish between cases where someone is expressing
TOLERANCE and cases where he is expressing this new attitude; but that might
not seem so worrisome.
What is worrisome, however, is that this move completely undermines
the shift away from the proposal explored in §10.4.2. In that section,
I argued that DA-expressivists are unlikely to be able to develop a plausible
normative psychology that makes sense of there being two distinct, primi-
tive attitudes—DISAPPROVAL and TOLERANCE—that are inconsistent, yet only
one of which involves SNJ. Every concern raised there will reapply mutatis
mutandis to this solution—i.e. to the plausibility of claiming that DISAP-
PROVAL and NIHILO are inconsistent, though only one involves SNJ.37
10.6 CONCLUSION
Doubt and Not Exhaustive seem to me independently plausible claims
about normative thought and language. What’s more, I believe that those
with relevant intuitions about normative objectivity should endorse them. If
I’m right, however, expressivists in the DA and BAS camps cannot both
solve the negation problem and accommodate these claims.
37 Or, more properly, to the plausibility of claiming that there is some attitude NIHILO
that involves an absence of DISAPPROVAL and is inconsistent with DISAPPROVAL in the sense
required, though, unlike DISAPPROVAL, it does not involve SNJ.
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This may or may not extend to all forms of expressivism. If it does, then
even if the quasi-realist can vindicate quasi-objectivity, quasi-objectivity may
not be objective enough. But even if my arguments do not generalize in this
way, I hope to have narrowed the ﬁeld of expressivist views that can
accommodate certain intuitions about objectivity. If my strategy can be
developed more broadly, exploring the semantic implications of other
relevant intuitions, perhaps we can move closer to a dialectic which bears
more directly on the “deeper worries” that keep so many of us ﬁrmly
entrenched in the cognitivist camp.
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